Abstract: Bans on retail tobacco displays, of the type proposed by New York's Mayor Bloomberg in March 2013, have been operative in several economies since 2001. Despite an enormous number of studies in public health journals using attitudinal data, we can find no econometric event studies of the type normally used in Economics. This paper attempts to fill that gap by using data from 13 cross sections of the annual Canadian Tobacco Use Monitoring Surveys. These data afford an ideal opportunity to study events of this type given that each of Canada's 10 provinces implemented display bans at various points between 2003 and 2009. Accordingly, we use difference-in-difference methods to study three behaviors following the introduction of bans: participation in smoking, the intensity of smoking and quit intentions. A critical element of the study concerns the treatment of contraband tobacco. Our estimates provide very little support for the hypothesis that behaviors changed following the bans.
Introduction
In March of 2013, New York's Mayor Bloomberg proposed that cigarette vendors be prevented from displaying their products openly in retail outlets. Such displays are most frequently located on shelves behind the cashier. In Mr. Bloomberg's view, and in the view of many health advocates, they serve to "normalize" cigarettes and also act as advertising. Their presence may furthermore prompt unplanned purchases and hence increase tobacco consumption. Since cigarettes are an accepted carcinogen, responsible for many thousands of deaths in New York each year, the proposal might contribute to the long-term objective of reducing mortality and morbidity.
Should a retail display ban (RDB) progress to legislation, vendors would be required to put cigarettes and other tobacco products out of customer view -in covered shelving, or camouflaged by a blind of some type. In addition to possibly reducing the purchase of cigarettes by adults, this proposal would afford children and teens greater shelter from a toxic product. 1 Tobacco retail displays are a unique marketing mechanism. Universally these displays form a "power wall" at the point of payment. Tobacco sales carry a high margin for vendors, and manufacturers have feared losing their right to display their products in this way (Harper 2005) . These retail displays are distinguished from other point-of-sale marketing techniques by their scale, their ubiquity and permanence. Numerous studies examine the impact on sales of product-and brand-specific promotions (for example, Gedenk and Neslin 1998) . The tobacco power walls however form a marketing mechanism both for individual brands and tobacco as a whole.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the efficiency of such a deterrent measure, using data from Canada's provinces. A precisely similar measure was implemented at different points in time in each of Canada's Provinces in the new millennium. The annual Canadian Tobacco Use Monitoring Surveys (CTUMS) contain responses to monthly interviews with 20,000 individuals each year on their smoking habits, and are available from 1999 to the present time. Since the interview month is reported in the data, and given that the month and year during which the retail display bans were introduced vary by province, these data provide an ideal opportunity to examine whether bans of the type proposed for New York may be effective either at the extensive margin -in reducing smoking participation, or at the intensive margin -in reducing the number of cigarettes smoked per person per week, or indeed whether they induce people to adopt an intention to quit.
Measures of this type have been operative for a number of years in several economies. Both England and Wales adopted bans for large retail outlets in 2012, and corner stores will be required to adhere to the ban by 2015. Scotland introduced such a measure for large stores in 2013; smaller stores will become subject to the ban in 2015. Singapore, at the time of writing, is preparing for a public discussion on the introduction of the measure. Several states in Australia have adopted bans (Scollo and Winstanley 2012) . Iceland was an early adopter in 2001 while Ireland introduced this ban in 2009. Norway followed suit in 2012. In sum, display bans are operative in numerous jurisdictions, and the key question for policymakers is whether such bans are effective in changing smoking behavior, and if they are, to what degree.
The existing research on display bans contains few, if any, population-based econometric studies.
2 This is partly because the measures are relatively new in most economies, and partly because the survey data necessary for the analysis is sparse. In particular, only one of the above economies (Australia) has a federal structure that permits bans to be implemented in a decentralized (and hence asynchronous) manner, which improves the possibility of being able to find some signals in the data. Most studies that have addressed the potential effectiveness of these bans have asked individuals if they approve of the measures, or if they think the measures should be helpful in quitting, or if being exposed to marketing makes them more susceptible to smoking. The very large samples that are available through the CTUMS make it possible to investigate if the bans have actually deterred smoking or have reduced the intensity of smoking.
Being able to measure the impact of specific policy measures on actual smoking behavior, rather than beliefs about the effectiveness of bans, has assumed greater importance in view of a recent ruling in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in 2012: A federal judge ruled in favor of tobacco manufacturers in their objection to the Food and Drug Administration's proposals to require graphic health warnings (GHWs) on cigarette and tobacco packaging in general. The Court was not satisfied with the results from "attitudinal" studies, and ruled that the FDA had provided "not a shred of evidence" that the introduction of GHWs would reduce the number of American smokers (Huang et al. 2013 ). These authors also provide a timeline for this ruling. At the end of the day, the Court was not satisfied with distal attitudinal evidence, and its ruling was based on the lack of solid proximate evidence on the impact of that measure on smoking prevalence. In the absence of such evidence the Court ruled that the First Amendment rights of the tobacco manufacturers would be violated by the GHWs proposed by the FDA under a section of the 2009 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act. This precedent set by the Court suggests that if RDBs are to be put in place in the US, solid evidentiary findings on their impact on actual behaviors in other economies could be critical.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we review the relevant literature. Section 3 describes the timeline of RDB adoption across provinces in Canada, the empirical methodology that can exploit such variation in adoption dates, and the implication of the presence in the market of contraband tobacco for our estimation. Section 4 describes the data source. Section 5 presents the main results and robustness checks. Section 6 offers a discussion and concludes.
Existing Literature and Approaches
The results that emerge from many of the public health studies on RDBs [also termed point-of-purchase (PoP) bans] are suggestive rather than conclusive. For example, McNeill et al. (2011) found that vendor compliance to PoP bans was high in Ireland, that support for the law grew post implementation, and that interviewees thought it would be easier to quit as a result of the display ban law being enacted. But they found no evidence of significant short-term prevalence changes among youth or adults. Yet the article concludes positively: "there were encouraging signs that the law helped to denormalize smoking." Using the same data, Quinn et al. (2011) found that no statistically significant change in sales during the 12 months following the introduction of the display ban. The interesting conclusion drawn by the authors is that a change in behavior should not be observable in the near term: "The removal of point of sale displays is aimed at reducing the pernicious effects of tobacco advertising on children and is therefore likely to have an impact on sales over a much more protracted time period." 3 Scheffels and Lavik (2013) used Norwegian data. Focus group interviews were carried out before and after the ban among smokers and non-smokers. Behavior changes are not recorded, and the article concludes "Consumers believed that the ban could contribute to preventing smoking initiation among young people and to some extent also support cessation efforts." Hoek et al. (2009) interviewed 20 individuals in depth following the implementation of the ban in New Zealand. They write: "participants strongly supported banning tobacco retail displays primarily because they thought this would reduce youth initiation, promote greater consistency with smoke-free promotions and assist those attempting to quit." Brown et al. (2011) followed several thousand smokers in Canada between 2006 and 2009. They found strong support among smokers for the ban, and concluded that "the implementation of tobacco control measures, such as the removal of tobacco displays, appear to sustain support among smokers, those most likely to oppose such measures." Clattenburg et al. (2013) focus upon unplanned purchases of cigarettes, given that these may be triggered by displays. They interviewed 301 Vermont smokers immediately after their tobacco purchases, and found that 11% of cigarette purchases were unplanned, with 31% of total buyers agreeing that point-of-sale-advertising made quitting more difficult. Consequently the authors conclude that "Reducing unplanned purchases prompted by tobacco point of sale advertising could improve the likelihood of successful cessation among smokers." Wakefield et al. (2008) report a similar finding. These authors do not investigate if a smoker, not having purchased cigarettes as a result of the absence of displays, may purchase cigarettes at another retail outlet before exhausting his or her stock. Hence, a finding such as this provides little guidance as to whether actual prevalence or number of cigarettes smoked decline in response to PoP bans. Li et al. (2013) explore the Canadian data and confirm that smokers' exposure to tobacco marketing declined markedly following the imposition of retail display bans. They did not examine actual smoker behaviors.
A second characteristic of this literature is that the statistical work suffers from several inference-related issues. One is endogeneity. Several studies (e.g., MacFadyen et al. 2001) find that teens who possess promotional materials from cigarette manufacturers are more likely to smoke than students who do not. But the possession of such materials could equally well be an outcome rather than a cause of smoking. The second issue is measurement. For example, Sargent et al. (2002) correlated susceptibility to smoking on the part of middle-school students with the number of exposures to cigarette messages in movies. The number of messages is the product of movies watched times messages per movie. But the causation could either be attributable to the intensity of tobacco messages per movie or to the number of movies watched. The third issue is that of "unobservables." For example, Henriksen et al. (2004) find that students who are more exposed to promotion and messaging in corner stores are more susceptible to smoking than students who are less exposed. Again, this exposure measure might indeed capture the impact of the amount of promotion, but equally may reflect individual type -teens who tend to "hang out" in corner stores may be a personality type more likely to smoke. A widely cited review of this literature (Paynter and Edward 2009 ) presents a favorable perspective on RDBs, but it does not venture into the specification of models or the possibility that the conclusions offered in the articles reviewed may be consistent with more than one hypothesis.
In contrast to this literature, there exist a number of econometric studies that focus on the smoking behaviors of particular subgroups of the general population. For example, Harris et al. (2014) , Adams et al. (2012) and Abrevaya (2006) examine the impact of tobacco use and tobacco control measures (though not RDBs) on birth outcomes and behavior during pregnancy. However, we can find no large-sample, multivariate econometric studies on the effectiveness of RDBs in changing measured behavior in the general population. There appears to be no large data base available apart from the CTUMS that enables treatment and control groups to be formed and compared with actual behaviors as the outcomes. Compliance to the laws would seem to be universal. In contrast to regulations such as the prohibition of sales to minors, where verification is more difficult, verification of the banning of retail displays is immediate and simple. Cohen et al. (2011) indicate that their survey of retail outlets yielded a 99.8% compliance rate. 
Empirical Methodology

Cigarette Display Bans in Canada
Difference-in-Differences Design
To estimate the causal effect of the display bans, we employ the difference-indifferences (DD) methodology that exploits the variation in the timing of the law coming into effect across Canadian provinces, as noted in Table 1 . The DD method is often used to evaluate the treatment effect of a medical or policy intervention on a subset of groups. 5 It explicitly accounts for variations in treatment across groups and over time by calculating the change over time for each group (the first difference) and then subtracting the resulting change in the control group from the treatment group (the second difference). The control group in our study is composed of those years and months of data in provinces prior to the ban implementation; the treatment group is the complement of this.
As long as the treatment and control groups are affected by time-varying confounding variables in a similar way, the DD estimates will reflect the effect of the legislation. Formally, we estimate a DD regression of the following form, for individual i in year t in province p:
Y indicates outcome variables; Display Ban is the DD indicator variable of interest, equal to 1 if the individual is in a province and a time period when the law is effective, and zero otherwise; β represents the DD estimate of the effect of the legislation. The interpretation of the policy coefficient is the change in the outcomes following the policy, compared to the pre-policy period and to the provinces with no bans in place. X is a vector of control variables that include individual characteristics (education, gender, marital status, etc.). The time effects χ include monthly dummies (there are 11 month dummies which control for seasonal effects) and yearly dummies (which control for year specific unobserved factors and shocks). The province-specific fixed effects η control for time-invariant differences across provinces (such as smoking cultures, levels of spending on healthcare, etc.).
The DD technique assumes that the trends in the smoking outcomes for both the treated and control groups would be the same in the absence of the legislation. We will examine and explicitly control for any differences in the trends before the legislation by including province-specific linear and quadratic time trends. We estimate the DD regression using linear probability models.
The Problem of Contraband Product
While the CTUMS form a detailed month-to-month description of smoking behaviors across the economy, the behaviors reported are subject to the influence of illegal tobacco products.
6 Illegal product accounts for almost one quarter of the total market in many developed economies. This is the estimate of West et al. (2008) for the UK for example. Even in the US, where tobacco taxes have been low historically, there are concerns about the possible growth in supply from Indian reservations in the face of recent dramatic increases in state taxes. At the time of writing, a pack of cigarettes costs around $10 in New York City and this has given rise to legal disputes over the treatment of reservation sales (Tobacco Free Kids 2009).
Although the presence of illegal products in the Canadian market does not distinguish it from most other tobacco markets in the modern era, its presence has significant consequences for data analysis. First, the price of the cigarette aggregate, as registered by an official price index, may vastly overstate the price that consumers are paying at times when the illegal product accounts for a large share of the market. Second, individuals who actually purchase the illegal product are less likely to report their behaviors truthfully in surveys. The consequence of the first problem is that the official price series is biased upwards for those time periods when illegal sales are significant. This errors-in-variables problem may result in biased coefficient estimates (Wooldridge 2009: p. 318 ). The consequence of the second problem is that total sales of cigarettes -as 6 Illegal tobacco is a world-wide phenomenon. Many developed economies have seen an enormous tax-induced wedge open up between unit production cost and the legal retail price. For example, in Canada where most of the illicit product comes through First Nations reserves, ziplock bags of 200 cigarettes sell for between $10 and $20 to the end user, and still yield substantial profits to the vendors (Royal Canadian Mounted Police 2011). This translates into a price per pack to the smoker of between $1 and $2, compared to a retail price in the legal market in the neighborhood of $10.
Evidently, at such low prices, cigarettes are cheap to produce and distribute, and organized gangs see this product as being as profitable as drugs such as cocaine, heroin or marijuana, but traffic in cigarettes (and marijuana) carry lower penalties than the "harder" substances (Easton 2004) .
Internationally, certain economies appear to turn a blind eye to the existence of production facilities set up domestically that are geared to supply an illegal overseas market. These cigarettes are referred to as "illicit whites." An example of this is a brand called "Jin Ling"; it is produced in a Russian tax-free zone (Kaliningrad). Other examples are "Raquel" from Cyprus and "Richman" from the United Arab Emirates (Joossens and Raw 2011) . A variant of this behavior involves established legal producers in the West exporting product, duty free, knowing that it will be imported illegally elsewhere. Joossens and Raw report that the magnitude of this particular form of contraband has declined as a result of investigations of, and lawsuits against, manufacturers. measured by consumer responses -will be biased downwards by more than the normal degree. 7 The extent to which these two problems affect the coefficient estimates on the display bans also depends upon the correlation between the timing of peak illegal sales and the behavior of the key variable in our analysis -the implementation dates of the display bans. Figure 1 describes the pattern of illegal sales we This assumption matches police reports, in this period of relatively low legal prices. For each of these base years the authors establish a factor of proportionality between the quantity of cigarettes smoked economy wide on the basis of responses to the CTUMS on the one hand, and actual reported legal sales on the other. When such a factor of proportionately is applied to sales in the mid and later years of the decade a substantial gap is observed between reported legal sales and predicted total consumption. The difference is attributed to contraband product. This method is considered superior to measures based on police seizures of illegal product, on account of the variability of the latter and also on account of the fact that seizures are recognized to represent just a tiny fraction of total contraband.
have estimated for the Canadian market using a fairly standard method described in Physicians for a Smoke-Free Canada (2011) . In essence, we compute an estimate of the total market by assuming there is no illegal product in the early years and then use surveys to predict total sales, legal and illegal, in future years by inflating survey responses. From this total we subtract legally-reported sales to yield the illegal market share as a residual.
A critical aspect of Figure 1 is that it indicates illegal sales were at their peak at the time display bans were introduced in Quebec and Ontario (see Table 1 ) -markets which together account for a substantial share of the total Canadian market. Since artificially higher prices and the illegal share are at their maximum at a time when the retail display bans were introduced in these markets, we cannot be sure that our models will correctly attribute causation.
Two solutions to this collinearity cum errors-in-variables combination suggest themselves: one is to use data up to the beginning of the contraband problem (roughly 2005); the second is to exclude those provinces where contraband was most serious. Quebec's Ministère de la Sécurité Publique (2011) proposes that virtually the complete contraband problem for all years is confined to Quebec and Ontario. Accordingly, our primary strategy is to estimate the DD models for eight of Canada's ten provinces using data for all available years of the survey. We also estimate the models up to and including the year 2005 for all provinces. The latter is a weaker approach because the identification of the ban effects hinge essentially on two provinces -Saskatchewan (which introduced the ban in 2002, then shelved it and re-imposed it in 2005 following a successful court ruling), and Manitoba (which implemented the ban midway through 2005).
Data, Variables and Descriptive Analysis
The Canadian Tobacco Use Monitoring Surveys interview people aged 15 and above and provide the most comprehensive long-term data series on tobacco use by Canadians. Our analysis employs all CTUMS cycles, from 1999 to 2011, for eight of the ten Canadian provinces (i.e., excluding Ontario and Quebec). These cross-sectional surveys have a number of features that make them well suited for this analysis. First, the CTUMS are available for the years before and after the ban, thus facilitating the application of the DD methods. Second, they report the month associated with each interview, so we can identify the period before and after the policy at the monthly level. Third, since its lowest admissible age is 15, we can study the effect of display bans on both youth and adult groups separately. This is valuable given that part of the public health push for display bans is premised on the idea that, in addition to reducing unplanned purchases by mature smokers, young smokers and young potential smokers grow up not seeing smoking as a "normal" activity. Fourth, the CTUMS have rich information on smoking behaviors -not only on participation, but also on intensity and quit intentions. This allows us to study a variety of potential policy impacts.
Our analysis focuses on three outcome variables: (i) an indicator of whether a person currently smokes (prevalence); (ii) the number of cigarettes smoked weekly by a smoker (intensity); and (iii) whether the person intends to quit in the next 1 and 6 months. Estimating a prevalence equation captures the net impact of a policy on quitters and new smokers combined. Hence, youth initiation impacts are captured only implicitly. Information on new smokers is not available in the CTUMS and, accordingly, we search primarily for an impact of the policy measure in question on the balance between the inflows and outflows to the stock of smokers. Examining the potential impact of a policy on the quantity of cigarettes smoked by a typical smoker is possibly as important as understanding its impact on prevalence: if smokers on average reduce their tobacco intake the result should be an improvement in health, even if there is no discernable impact on prevalence. These are the two primary outcomes of interest in our analysis. In addition, we study quit intentions because they may provide a sense of whether intentions, or changes in intentions, actually carry through into concrete behavioral changes on the part of smokers. Quit intentions on the part of a given individual vary substantially over time periods as short as one month (Hughes et al. 2005) . Despite this variability, searching for an impact on quit intentions is valid because the search is for an impact on the balance of intentions.
8 Table 2 displays the characteristics of the CTUMS data used in our analyses. Twenty percent of our sample consists of current smokers. Among those who smoke, the reported average number of cigarettes consumed per week is 69, about 10 per day. The average age is 44, with youngest age being 15 and oldest respondents being 95. Sixty-one percent of the sample has secondary education or lower or is still in school, while 17% has a college degree and the remaining 22% a university degree. The survey deliberately oversamples youth, but we use weighted observations in all of our estimations. About 1/4 of the sample are single. Household size averages three persons. Eighty-nine percent of the sample speaks English and 2% uses French while the rest use other languages. Males account for 50% of the sample.
The trends in participation and number of cigarettes smoked per smoker, for each province, are presented in Figures 2 and 3 . The trends have been 8 Technically the subpopulation of intending quitters could be thought of as the outcome of a steady-state Markov model: individuals are constantly changing, but in such a manner that the system is stable. Searching for an impact of a policy intervention in effect searches for a change in the balance of flows. We are grateful to a referee for drawing our attention to this issue. de-seasonalized (that is, the month-specific effects have been removed). The vertical lines denote the times at which RDBs were introduced. These unconditional graphics do not immediately suggest breaks in behavior.
Regression Results
Baseline Estimates
Effect on Smoking Participation
The effect of the RDB on smoking prevalence is reported in Table 3 . Column 1 displays estimates from the base-line regression using the strategy described above -the sample for eight provinces for the period 1999-2011. All regressions include month and province fixed effect variables, though we do not report the associated coefficients. The policy coefficient estimate is interpreted as the change (in percentage points) in the probability of smoking following the policy in the adopting province, relative to the period before the display ban adoption and relative to the provinces where the ban had not yet become effective. The coefficient estimates indicate that the ban has no detectable impact on smoking participation: the numerical value is small (c. 0.001) and not statistically sig- Each column shows the results from a DD regression estimated by OLS. Data from eight provinces (excluding Ontario and Quebec) for the period 1999-2011. All models include province, month, and year fixed effects. Standard errors throughout are clustered at the province level and estimates are weighted. Inference uses t-distribution with 5 degrees of freedom. Significance levels are: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
nificant. 9 Other covariates have expected signs: the age variable has an inverted U-shape; compared with the omitted education category of less-than-secondary schooling, people of higher education are less likely to smoke; married people or those living in common law are less likely to smoke, while those who are separated are the opposite; those who speak either English or French are more likely to be smokers than those who use other languages; men are more likely to smoke than women and those who live in larger households are less likely to smoke.
As the DD regressions assume the trends in outcomes across provinces are similar, in the next two columns we include province-specific linear time trends in the regressions (column 2) and quadratic trends (column 3) to control for the potential differences in time trends across provinces. The trends are almost invariably negative, and where the quadratic term is included it is generally positive, indicating that the rate of participation decline slows. Surprisingly, the price variable does not have a significant impact in this regression. This may be because prices truly are not significant in influencing participation, or because they are strongly correlated with the time variable during the period 2000-2005. 10 To test the degree of collinearity between province-level prices and time trends we regressed the real cigarette price in each province against time and time squared.
11 As anticipated, the coefficient on the linear term was positive; it was also significant in every case. The coefficient on the quadratic term was negative and significant in every case. This pattern corresponded to expectations given that virtually all of the price increases in every province took place between 2000 and 2005. The R 2 varied between 0.85 and 0.95. Ultimately we are not concerned with the precise value of the price elasticity provided that the treatment of the price variable does not contaminate the coefficient on 9 Recent econometric literature has drawn attention to the issue of underestimated standard errors in estimation that involves clustered data (see, Moulton 1990; Bertrand et al. 2004 ). Among recommended remedies to this problem, Donald and Lang (2007) proposed the use of the t-distribution with G-L degrees of freedom rather than the standard normal distribution for inference, where G is the number of clusters and L is the number of regressors that are invariant within clusters. More recent research suggests the use of wild-t bootstrapping in the case of few clusters (Cameron and Miller 2013) . In this study we employ the t-distribution with G-L degrees of freedom for inference. Given that most of our estimates are already statistically insignificant based on this correction which over-rejects for few clusters, the use of the wild-t bootstrapping approach would not change our main results and conclusions. 10 Prices are also correlated across provinces through time on account of tax dynamics: tobacco taxation is a shared federal-provincial jurisdiction, and changes in federal excise tax rates usually trigger a response in provincial taxes. 11 These results are available upon request. the display ban. Adda and Cornaglia (2013) and Abrevaya and Puzzello (2012) discuss the challenges of estimating price and tax effects accurately in a similar context.
Effect on Smoking Intensity
The second set of regressions examines the impact of the ban on smoking intensity measured by the log of the number of cigarettes smoked per week. We estimate these regressions using OLS and the subsample of smokers only, which means that this analysis is equivalent to a second-stage estimation of a traditional two-stage smoking model. The policy coefficient is interpreted as the percentage change in the number of cigarettes smoked per week as the result of introducing the RDB. Note that because the ban did not change the composition of who smokes, as shown in the previous section, there is no compositional bias for the estimates from these intensity regressions.
The results are reported in Table 4 . The coefficient on the policy dummy from the baseline regression reported in column 1 is negative but small (-0.04) and statistically insignificant. All other covariates carry signs and statistical significance levels that are consistent with their values in the participation equation.
The second and third columns of this table furnish estimates from regressions that include province-specific time trends. The display ban effects become larger in magnitude (from -0.04 to -0.05 and -0.08) but are still not statistically significant. In contrast to the results in the participation regression above, the price coefficients become larger and statistically significant, indicating that higher prices lead to lower smoking intensity. Table 5 contains estimates associated with a 6-month ahead quit intention variable as the outcome. The CTUMS ask smokers two questions on quit intentions: if they intend to quit within the coming month, and if they intend to quit in the coming 6 months. In these regressions our samples are composed of all smokers, estimated without time trends and then with linear and quadratic terms included. Again we can detect no evidence of the ban having an impact on quit intentions. While the coefficient is negative in all of the six regressions, in no case is it significant. 12 12 The "six" regressions include the 1-month ahead quit intention as well as the 6-month ahead. The results for the former sample are available from the authors upon request.
Effect on Quit Intentions
Robustness Tests
Choice of Estimator
We reran the participation regression using a probit model, rather than OLS, to see if the results might differ. This estimation failed to reject the null hypoth- Each column shows the results from a DD regression estimated by OLS. Data from eight provinces (excluding Ontario and Quebec) for the period 1999-2011. All models include province, month, and year fixed effects. Standard errors throughout are clustered at the province level and estimates are weighted. Inference uses t-distribution with 5 degrees of freedom. Significance levels are: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Each column shows the results from a DD regression estimated by OLS. Data from eight provinces (excluding Ontario and Quebec) for the period 1999-2011. All models include province, month, and year fixed effects. Standard errors throughout are clustered at the province level and estimates are weighted. Inference uses t-distribution with 5 degrees of freedom. Significance levels are: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
esis of no ban impact. The coefficient estimates (reported in the upper panel of Table 6 ) were very small and close to those returned from the OLS estimates and not significant (except for the regression with a quadratic trend included). All models include province, month, and year fixed effects. Standard errors throughout are clustered at the province level and estimates are weighted. Inference uses t-distribution with 5 degrees of freedom. Significance levels are: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
Using Quit Attempts Instead of Quit Intentions
We estimated the models using actual quit attempts instead of quit intentions as the outcome. Quit attempts represent a stronger form of quitting efforts than quit intentions and are an indicator of smoking cessation or relapse among those who have recently tried to quit. As quit attempts may be related to unplanned purchases, a mechanism through which a display ban might affect smoking behavior, they may capture better the effect of the display ban on smoking behavior. The CTUMS ask smokers how many times they stopped smoking for at least 24 hour over the past 12 months because they were trying to quit. We constructed a variable capturing the number of quit attempts based on responses to this question. As it is a count variable with many zero values, we modelled this outcome using the zero-inflated negative binomial estimator. The results indicate that the ban did not lead to an increase in the number of quit attempts, nor increase the probability of having any at-least-24-hour quit attempt. 
Excluding Smuggling Period
We estimated the models up to and including the year 2005 for all 10 provinces, given there was little smuggling for that period. A disadvantage of this exercise is that the identification of the ban effects hinges essentially on two provincesSaskatchewan and Manitoba, as explained earlier. The results are reported in the second panel (for participation outcome), the third panel (for intensity outcome) and the fourth panel (for quit intention outcome) in Table 6 . The display ban coefficients are small and not statistically significant.
Controlling for Public-Place Smoking Bans
The time trends may not be able to control for policies that occurred around the same time as the display bans and affected the smoking outcomes. If that is the case, the display ban coefficient estimates may be biased. Examining tobaccorelated policies over the period 1999-2011 suggests that one potentially confounding policy is the public place smoking bans. For example, smoking bans in public places were adopted in Alberta in January 2008 and in British Columbia in March 13 These results are available upon request. The output of a zero inflated negative binomial regression has two sets of coefficients: the first set of coefficients is from the equation predicting counts for the "positive outcome" group. The second set of coefficients is from the equation that predicts membership in "zero outcome" group. These can be interpreted as logit coefficients.
2008, which were close to the timings of its display bans (see Table 1 ). To address this potential timing correlation, we explicitly include a dummy for public place smoking bans in the regressions. This public place smoking ban indicator variable is constructed in a similar way as the display ban policy dummy, i.e., it is based on different timings of public place smoking ban's adoption across different provinces in Canada. The estimates with this public place smoking ban indicator included are presented in the bottom three panels of Table 6 . They indicate that the previous results remain robust to its inclusion.
Effects on Different Age Groups and Smoking Statuses
Although the effect of the ban on smoking participation for the whole population appears insignificant, it might still impact some specific age groups. Media and policy discussions often suggest that youth would be less likely to smoke in the absence of tobacco displays. To explore this, we re-estimated the regressions for several specific age groups, focussing upon youth (15-24), prime age (25-64) and older (65+) smokers. The top panel of Table 7 displays estimates from the participation regression. In all three specifications, the display ban coefficients are small and statistically insignificant for each age group. The middle panel reports estimates for the intensity regressions. The display ban is negative in all three age groups, and we finally encounter a negative and significant coefficient -for the youngest age group 15-24. However, this effect is not invariant to the inclusion of province-specific time trends. Estimates for the quit intention regression are reported in the bottom panel of Table 7 . Again, the display ban has no significant effect on quit intentions for any age group. The display ban coefficients are either positive (though small and statistically insignificant) or have the wrong sign.
Since the impact of RDBs on youth may depend upon whether young smokers obtain their tobacco legally or not, we reestimated the above set of equations for those individuals above the legal age limit. Those aged 16, for example, may obtain their tobacco from friends and thus not be subject to the impact of pointof-sale marketing. When the age of 18 is used as a cut-off we found no impact of the RDBs on participation, but found a positive impact on intensity in most, though not all, of the regressions. Also, since the legal age of smoking is 19 in some provinces, we used the corresponding subset of provinces to reestimate the equations. Ontario has a legal age of 19, though has large illegal sales in some years. So we explored the impact both including and excluding Ontario. When Ontario was excluded the RDBs were found, as before, to impact intensity but not participation. When Ontario was included the intensity effect disappeared. Some significant impacts on intentions were present. In summary, the bans may have impacted the intensity of legal youth smoking, though not the participation rates.
Occasional and Daily Smokers
As occasional and daily smokers might behave differently in response to the ban, we re-estimated the DD regressions for these two separate smoker groups. Intensity outcomes are reported in the upper panel of Table 8 , and indicate that bans have no significant effect on either of these two groups of smokers. Neither does the display ban impact smoker quit intentions: as shown in the lower panel of Table 8 , the coefficients on the display ban are small and statistically insignificant.
Conclusion
Our objective in exploring the impact of retail tobacco display bans has been to see if a population-based study based on a quasi-experiment design might shed light on actual behaviors following the introduction of such bans. They have been introduced in several jurisdictions and a large literature in the public health field supports such bans. Many of these studies are "attitudinal": they are based upon data describing how smokers and nonsmokers feel about the bans. For example, do they "believe the bans are good," or that the bans "should help smokers quit," Each column shows the results from a DD regression estimated by OLS. Data from eight provinces (excluding Ontario and Quebec) for the period 1999-2011. All models include province, month, and year fixed effects. Standard errors throughout are clustered at the province level and estimates are weighted. Inference uses t-distribution with 5 degrees of freedom. Significance levels are: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
or "denormalize smoking for minors?" Some of these studies also lend themselves to being interpreted in more than one way because of problems associated with the specification of variables and the models. Other econometric studies that do find significant impacts (both small and large) aim at particular subpopulations, such as pregnant women. Consequently, the current study may be the first of its type, and while the data base used is ideal for confronting the question at hand, we find no systematic support for a significant impact of the bans on participation or quit intentions, and just limited support (among youth) for a reduction in intensity. Our findings are invariant to a number of robustness checks. In particular, provincespecific time trends were included in most of our regressions in order to capture the impact of changes in culture, and the impacts of whatever other economic and societal changes took place during this period. Time trends frequently deprive the coefficients of interest of significance, if the two are correlated, but this is not the case in our analysis. In virtually all regressions, whether a time trend was included or not, the RDB coefficient was largely unaffected. Hence the RDB impacts are not being swept up by the time trend.
That said, the hypotheses we have tested warrant some amplification. Our study focused on investigating the possibility of a significant difference in behaviors before and after the implementation of RDBs. This is a classical "event" study that searches for a behavior break post-event. Technically, the dummy variable measures the average impact of the measure over all post-event periods. In our study the switch is turned on immediately after the event, not with a lag. This choice has several merits. First, in the absence of reasonable priors or theory on how long lags should be, one could test numerous lag structures and perhaps one such structure might enable us to reject the null for some behaviors; but the statistical meaning of such an approach is not obvious. Second, the "unplanned purchase" rationale for RDBs suggests that behavior should change quickly for a large class of smokers: if displays trigger the memory of smokers to purchase cigarettes then the absence of displays should have an immediate impact on that particular group. At the same time, as stated in the introduction, care must be exercised in using this reasoning: an individual who is not prompted to purchase cigarettes by the absence of a retail display may still remember to purchase cigarettes before exhausting his or her stock. Third, a majority of smokers at any given time intend to quit. In view of this it is reasonable to think of policy measures as "tipping" events for existing smokers. That is, they help individuals who have, in a particular sense, already decided to quit, to make the transition. And it is reasonable to expect a new policy measure in that context to have an early impact. In addition to the foregoing perspectives it is worth emphasizing that, in event studies, if the major impact is felt several periods later (as opposed to right away), such a difference in behavior should still be reflected in the estimated coefficient coming out of the DD model, even if the behavior changes were not particularly strong at the moment the switch is turned on. The event study is not a test of an immediate break, it is a test of a difference of behaviors on average before and after.
14 Despite the foregoing, we do not claim to have ruled out some longer term impact -perhaps at a level that is drowned out by the noise in the data. It is intuitively reasonable to think of measures that denormalize specific behaviors as having some effect, even if not large. For example, younger individuals may be less inclined to smoke in the absence of "normalizing" displays. Our results state that we can detect no significant break in behavior, not that we are certain none exists. But measuring such a potential longer-term impact remains a challenge.
